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A Missing Variable: The Impact of Cross-Border 
Insolvency Laws on Foreign Direct Investment 
Jason Jack 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) decisions are based on a 
variety of factors including economic conditions, diplomatic 
connections, and simple supply and demand, but the stability 
and development of a state’s insolvency laws are factors that are 
often overlooked.1 The World Bank provides a score for legal 
rights of creditors in a given state2 and data on FDI inflows for 
most countries of the world.3 An analysis of these two figures 
shows that states with more developed legal rights for creditors 
generally tend to have higher levels of FDI. There are several 
examples of states whose net inflows of FDI increased 
substantially from one year to another immediately following 
revisions and updates to insolvency laws.4 Some countries 
differentiate between cross-border and domestic insolvency, 
while others use the same system for foreign and domestic 
creditors and debtors.5 Among the variety of approaches, it is 
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 1. See ASHOKA MODY, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 38–39 (2007). 
 2. World Development Indicators: Financial access, stability, and 
efficiency, THE WORLD BANK (2016), http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.5. 
 3. Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows, THE WORLD BANK WORLD 
DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, [hereinafter WORLD BANK FDI] http://data
bank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=BX.KLT.DINV.CD.W
D&country (data accessed and saved on Nov. 13, 2017, on file with Minnesota 
Journal of International Law). 
 4. Compare id., with Michael Bader & Mark Montari, Swiss Debt 
Enforcement and Bankruptcy Law, in WORLD INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS, 629, 669; 
Dmitry Kurochkin, Overview of Russian Insolvency Law, in WORLD 
INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS 587, 587; Andrew Tetley, New Zealand, in WORLD 
INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 507, 508 (Otto Eduardo Fonseca 
Lobo, ed., 2009). 
 5. See R.W. Harmer, Report for Australia, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, 
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clear that corporations and individuals engaging in FDI consider 
insolvency laws as a significant factor that has usually been 
overlooked in other studies of FDI decisions. 
This Note will explore the impact of cross-border insolvency 
laws on FDI. Its purpose is to understand how insolvency laws 
impact FDI decisions of individuals and corporations. Part I 
provides a background of statistics and previous studies of FDI. 
It also provides a brief overview of bankruptcy to better 
understand the significance of the issues in Part II. Part II 
describes how various factors of insolvency laws impact FDI 
decisions. It does this by providing specific examples of 
insolvency law reforms having a direct impact on FDI. This Note 
concludes that improvement and modernization of insolvency 
laws usually has an immediate and direct impact on FDI. 
I. DESCRIBING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND 
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 
In 2015, global FDI totaled just over $2 trillion United 
States dollars (USD).6 Each country receives an average of $11 
billion USD.7 Unfortunately, the average contains many outliers 
that skew the results. Developed countries tend to have higher 
FDI amounts than developing countries.8 For example, slightly 
less than half of global FDI occurred in just six countries.9 It is 
also important to note that a significant portion of FDI is due to 
corporate mergers and acquisitions of existing corporations 
rather than investment in new enterprises.10 
 
22, 30 (stating there are no separate rules or procedures for domestic or foreign 
creditors to bring claims); Makoto Ito, Report for Japan, in CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY: NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES, REPORTS DELIVERED AT 
THE XIII INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, MONTREAL 1990 
178, 182 (Ian F. Fletcher, ed., 1992) (stating that territorial creditors are given 
priority in bankruptcy proceedings). 
 6. WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See J. Peter Neary, Trade Costs and Foreign Direct Investment, in 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 25 
(Steven Brackman & Harry Garretssen eds., 2008); WORLD BANK FDI, supra 
note 3 (showing around 50 percent of global FDI went to Mainland China, Hong 
Kong, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States). 
 9. See WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3 (showing Mainland China, Hong 
Kong, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States received 
$854,327,416,626 billion in foreign direct investment in 2015). 
 10. Neary, supra note 8, at 25–26. 
2018] CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY LAWS & FDI 315 
A. EVALUATING FDI 
A variety of factors are considered when individuals and 
corporations decide to engage in FDI in a particular state. The 
most significant factors are labor cost, corporate taxes, and 
market size.11 Other significant factors include geopolitical 
considerations, government stability, government support of 
private business activity, and the overall quality of a state’s legal 
system.12 Different entities and industries would rank the 
importance of each of these factors differently. For example, a 
newer company may be especially interested in government 
subsidization programs while a more established company may 
be more concerned with long-term corporate tax rates. 
Some countries try to encourage FDI within their borders 
through policies such as tax breaks or preferential loans and 
grants.13 One study that evaluated FDI concluded that United 
States corporations engaged in FDI undertook less FDI as new 
trade agreements were implemented.14 Corporations tend to 
favor FDI where they can take advantage of tax loopholes and 
concessions rather than equal treatment under treaties.15 Other 
policy decisions designed to influence FDI include funding for 
research and development and education programs designed to 
train skilled laborers.16 
A few countries have formally recognized a link between 
insolvency laws and FDI. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is 
currently working to reform of its insolvency laws specifically to 
encourage FDI.17 While the UAE currently has bankruptcy 
procedures in place, debtors are still subject to criminal 
penalties for non-payment of debts, even while working through 
 
 11. MODY, supra note 1, at 17. 
 12. See id. at 38–39. The list includes twenty-nine factors. It is interesting 
to note that insolvency laws are not mentioned on this list despite statistics 
showing it is a significant factor often considered. See id. 
 13. Magnus Blomstrum & Ari Kokko, The Economics of Foreign Direct 
Investment Incentives, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE REAL AND 
FINANCIAL SECTOR OF INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 37 (Heinz Hermann & Robert 
Lipsey, eds., 2003). 
 14. MODY, supra note 1, at 17. 
 15. Id. 
 16. C. Bellak, M. Leibrecht, & R. Stehrer, POLICIES TO ATTRACT FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT: AN INDUSTRY-LEVEL ANALYSIS, OECD GLOBAL F. ON 
INT’L INV. (2008), http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40301081.pdf. 
 17. Tom Arnold, Bankruptcy Law to Bring FDI Boost, THE NAT’L (Feb. 1, 
2013), http://www.thenational.ae/business/industry-insights/economics/
bankruptcy-law-to-bring-fdi-boost. 
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bankruptcy proceedings.18 Policies such as this would cause 
most evaluating FDI opportunities in the UAE to consider the 
severe consequences if an investment opportunity were to fail.19 
Even with discussion of reforms, the UAE currently has a very 
low score in the World Bank’s Legal Rights Index that will 
continue to impact FDI decisions.20 
B. OVERVIEW OF INSOLVENCY 
Many countries choose to emulate the bankruptcy processes 
and rights found in the United States.21 For example, when 
updating and reforming its bankruptcy laws in 2006, China 
based parts of their codes on United States bankruptcy 
procedures.22 Instead of rigid standards, the system is described 
as “[a] controlled, preset process, with clearly delineated 
boundaries, inside of which the parties have great flexibility to 
arrive at their own solutions.”23 How the United States 
addresses cross-border insolvency is a guiding standard for 
developing countries, as well as any state working to update 
insolvency laws.24 
Since bankruptcy laws in the United States are influential 
in international cross-border insolvency proceedings, a basic 
overview of United States bankruptcy procedures is useful in 
understanding the broader issues. It is first important to 
understand the technical distinction between “insolvency” and 
“bankruptcy.” “Insolvency” generally refers to the status of an 
individual or corporation being unable to pay debt.25 
“Bankruptcy” generally refers to the legal process used to resolve 
insolvency of a debtor.26 In practice, these terms are often used 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2. 
 21. See Joseph Wielebinski & Davor Rukavina, An Overview of the 
Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Practice in the United States, in WORLD 
INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS, supra note 4, at 693. 
 22. Rebecca Parry & Haizheng Zhang, China’s New Bankruptcy Law: 
Notable Features and Key Enforcement Issues, in INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 
LAW, REFORMS AND CHALLENGES 85, 90 (Paul Omar, ed., 2013). 
 23. Wielebinski & Rukavina, supra note 21, at 694. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See David Kirk, What is the Difference Between Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency?, THE GAZETTE, https://www.thegazette.co.uk/insolvency/content/
100329 (last visited Dec. 29, 2016). 
 26. See id. 
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interchangeably and some countries may have slightly different 
or very specific legal definitions of each. While most countries 
have a broad definition of each, Gibraltar has a very specific 
definition of insolvency being declared when a company owes 
£500 to any one creditor for over three weeks.27 
Once one has become insolvent, the usual procedure is to 
begin a bankruptcy proceeding.28 The most common proceedings 
are liquidation and reorganization.29 In liquidation, a 
bankruptcy court may appoint a trustee to manage and liquidate 
an estate on behalf of an individual debtor.30 A trustee is 
specifically authorized to collect the assets of an estate, liquidate 
these assets, adjudicate claims, and make distributions to 
creditors on behalf of the debtor.31 However, in practice, most 
individual debtors remain in possession of their estate.32 
Businesses may liquidate or reorganize and a trustee is 
generally not appointed in the process.33 In rare circumstances, 
such as when fraud or gross mismanagement has taken place, a 
court may appoint a trustee to oversee a business bankruptcy 
proceeding.34 
The prevalence of multinational corporations, improved 
communications, and liberalized trade policies work together to 
make international insolvency an important issue today. Cross-
border insolvency can have direct impacts on consumers. For 
example, the August 31, 2016, bankruptcy filing by Hanjin 
Shipping, a South Korean company, resulted in $14 billion in 
cargo being essentially stranded at sea while negotiations took 
place with creditors and while awaiting court orders protecting 
Hanjin from having ships seized upon entry into ports all around 
the world.35 A United States bankruptcy court was asked to 
 
 27. Issac Marrache, Gibraltar, in WORLD INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS, supra note 
4, at 364. 
 28. Wielebinski & Rukavina, supra note 21, at 695. 
 29. Id. at 706–07 (explaining that individuals usually liquidate while 
businesses usually reorganize, but either method is available to both 
individuals and businesses). 
 30. Id. at 706. 
 31. Id. at 715 
 32. Elizabeth Stong, United States, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
INSOLVENCIES AND DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS 409, 425 (James R. Sikenat & 
Charles D. Schmerler, eds., 2006). 
 33. Id. at 425. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Natalie Kitroeff, Hanjin Bankruptcy is the Tip of the Iceberg for Flailing 
Shippers, LA TIMES (Sep. 18, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-hanjin-shipping-industry-crisis-20160913-snap-story.html. 
318 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1 
determine if the lien rights available under United States law 
were enforceable even though a Korean court had issued a stay 
on creditor liens.36 The Korean order was formally recognized 
and adopted by the United States Bankruptcy Court.37 The court 
cited the United States adoption of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (“Model Law”) in reaching its 
decision.38 
The objective of the Model Law, as described in the official 
Guide to Enactment and Interpretation is “to assist States to 
equip their insolvency laws with a modern legal framework to 
more effectively address cross-border insolvency proceedings 
concerning debtors experiencing severe financial distress or 
insolvency.”39 The Model Law defines cross-border insolvency as 
proceedings in which a debtor has assets in more than one state 
or creditors in a different state from where the bankruptcy is 
occurring.40 Facilitation of international trade was a central 
policy guiding the creation and implementation of the Model 
Law.41 More specifically, the Model Law was designed to address 
issues of transparency, coordination, and conflicting laws.42 
On March 29, 2017, Westinghouse, a company specializing 
in constructing and maintaining nuclear reactors worldwide,43 
filed for bankruptcy.44 The corporation is based in the United 
States but is a subsidiary of Toshiba, a Japanese corporation.45 
The Asia division of Westinghouse includes plants in China, 
Japan, South Korea, India, Taiwan, and Vietnam.46 
 
 36. In re Hanjin Shipping Co. Ltd., No. 16-27041, 2016 WL 6679487, at *5 
(Bankr. N.J. Sept. 20, 2016). 
 37. Id. at *6. 
 38. Id. at *4. 
 39. UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to 
Enactment and Interpretation, UNCITRAL (2013), http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html (last visited Apr. 6, 
2017). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Diane Cardwell & Jonathan Soble, Westinghouse Files for Bankruptcy, 
in Blow to Nuclear Power, NY TIMES, (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/03/29/business/westinghouse-toshiba-nuclear-bankruptcy.
html?_r=1. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Westinghouse Asia, WESTINGHOUSE, http://www.westinghousenuclear.
com/About/Regional-Operations/Asia (last visited Apr. 7, 2017). 
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Westinghouse also operates in nine countries in Europe as well 
as South Africa and the UAE.47 Just one corporate bankruptcy 
will potentially involve claims or liquidation of assets from at 
least nineteen countries which demonstrates how widespread 
FDI activities and cross-border insolvency proceedings can be in 
just one corporation.48 
The development of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which was 
formally adopted in 1997, has been an important development 
in cross-border insolvency.49 The Model Law has been 
particularly helpful in resolving issues of jurisdiction in 
bankruptcy proceedings.50 For example, the Model Law, as 
adopted in the United States Bankruptcy Code, requires courts 
to evaluate a corporation’s “Center of Main Interests” (COMI) in 
determining proper jurisdiction.51 Factors used to determine 
COMI include location of headquarters, location of those who 
actually manage the debtor, location of debtor’s primary assets, 
location of the majority of debtor’s creditors, and the jurisdiction 
whose law would apply in most disputes.52 
While the Model Law was immediately influential, its 
significance and influence greatly improved when most of its 
provisions were added to the United States Bankruptcy Code in 
2005.53 Before the provisions were formally added to the 
Bankruptcy Code, United States bankruptcy courts had broad 
discretion in choosing to cooperate with foreign bankruptcy 
proceedings.54 This created uncertainty for foreign and domestic 
 
 47. Westinghouse Europe/Middle East/Africa, WESTINGHOUSE, 
http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/About/Regional-Operations/EMEA (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2017). 
 48. Westinghouse Americas, WESTINGHOUSE, http://www.westinghouse
nuclear.com/About/Regional-Operations/Americas (last visited Apr. 7, 2017). 
Westinghouse operates twenty-five facilities in the United States, most of which 
are nuclear power plants, and an additional plant in Brazil which brings the 
total to nineteen countries. See id. 
 49. UNCITRAL, supra note 39. 
 50. Megan R. O’Flynn, The Scorecard So Far: Emerging Issues in Cross-
Border Insolvencies Under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 32 NW J. 
INT’L. & BUS. 391, 403 (2012). 
 51. Id. 
 52. In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d 371 
B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 53. O’Flynn, supra note 50, at 396. 
 54. Id. But see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895) (“Where there has 
been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent 
jurisdiction . . . under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial 
administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of 
other countries . . . .”). 
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debtors and creditors. The adoption of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law made consideration of foreign court proceedings 
mandatory.55 So far, over 100 United States bankruptcy cases 
have cited the UNCITRAL provisions in decisions.56 As the 
United States continues to use the UNCITRAL Model Law for 
guidance, more countries will look to its provisions for guidance 
in formulating their own policy. Its use in the United States adds 
case law and further legitimizes the Model Law standards. 
One example of UNCITRAL Model Law being applied in 
United States courts is found in the case of Jaffé v. Samsung 
Electronics Co., Ltd.57 The court was asked to determine if the 
specific foreign bankruptcy proceeding in progress at the that 
time was to be recognized by United States courts.58 The Court 
specifically mentioned Chapter 15 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code being added in order to incorporate the Model 
Law.59 Based on the provisions of Chapter 15, the court 
determined that it was required to recognize the foreign 
proceeding in question.60 
Another example of a United States court citing the Model 
Law can be found in the case In re Betcorp Ltd.61 At issue was 
an Australian insolvency proceeding and whether the “winding 
up” of a business in Australia would be recognized in United 
States courts.62 The Bankruptcy Court cited the Model Law and 
considered Australia’s interpretation of the application of the 
Law as persuasive.63 Specifically, the court determined the 
insolvency in question would fall under Australian 
interpretation that “[Australian] company laws qualify under 
the Model Law.”64 This allowed the United States Court to 
recognize the Australian proceedings which provided protection 
for the debtor’s interests in the United States.65 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts: United States of America, UNCITRAL 
(2016), http://www.uncitral.org/clout/search.jspx?f=en%23cloutDocument.
country-ref0_s%3aUnited%5c+States%5c+of%5c+America (last visited Sept. 
10, 2017). 
 57. Jaffé v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 737 F.3d 14, 17 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 58. Id. at 18. 
 59. Id. at 23. 
 60. Id. at 24. 
 61. In re Betcorp Ltd., 400 B.R. 266 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009). 
 62. Id. at 271. 
 63. Id. at 282. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 271. 
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Foreign corporations with significant assets in the United 
States have also benefitted from emergency proceedings in 
United States bankruptcy courts. One extreme but illustrative 
example is found in the case of In re Yukos Oil Co.66 The company 
was incorporated in Russia and subject to forced sale of its global 
assets based on government decisions in Russia.67 The 
corporation had bank accounts in the United States as well as 
fifteen percent of its outstanding shares held in the United 
States.68 The Court determined that the accounts and shares 
gave the United States jurisdiction to issue an emergency order 
temporarily enjoining the sale of the corporation’s assets against 
all creditors except the Russian government.69 The delay 
provided through United States bankruptcy law was a factor 
that allowed arbitration to take place, eventually resulting in an 
approximately $50 billion judgment against the government of 
Russia for its efforts to break up the corporation.70 
C. LEGAL RIGHTS 
The World Bank provides a score on a scale of zero to twelve 
for “Strength of Legal Rights” for corporate entities.71 The 
average score is five and the United States received a score of 
eleven.72 Only three countries, Montenegro, New Zealand, and 
Colombia, received a score of twelve.73 Interestingly, all of these 
countries also had above average FDI relative to their 
populations.74 
The World Bank describes the index as measuring “the 
degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the 
rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending . . . 
with higher scores indicating that these laws are better designed 
to expand access to credit.”75 The statistics are collected as part 
 
 66. In re Yukos Oil Co., 320 B.R. 130 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004). 
 67. Id. at 132. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 138. 
 70. Jack Stubbs, Yukos Shareholders $50 Billion Win is Largest Arbitration 
Award Ever: GML Director, REUTERS (July 28, 2014, 4:11 AM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-yukos-gml-idUSKBN0FX0O620140728. 
 71. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3. New Zealand is one of the few 
countries that sent more FDI than it received. Id. 
 75. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2. 
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of a larger World Bank initiative known as the Doing Business 
project,76 which measures business regulations and their 
enforcement.77 Data is collected from 190 economies around the 
world at the national, regional, and city level.78 
A separate scoring metric was used by the Centre for 
Business Development at the University of Cambridge to track 
long-term development of creditor protection in the United 
States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany.79 The study 
provided a score for creditor protections on a scale of zero to one 
from 1970–2005.80 The study evaluated a variety of factors, 
including insolvency procedures, which were further scored 
within nineteen variables.81 Comparing these scores to World 
Bank FDI statistics shows a clear connection between 
development of insolvency laws and higher FDI figures in the 
countries that were evaluated.82 
The World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Asian 
Development Bank, and European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development have recognized the importance of insolvency laws 
in long-term development goals.83 These organizations generally 
require recipients of funding to enact insolvency reforms as a 
condition of aid.84 The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development states that “sustainable market development 
requires access to affordable credit. Capital investment can only 
happen in an environment where parties can manage the 
insolvency risk associated with credit relationships.”85 FDI is an 
important source of capital investment, particularly in 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. About Doing Business, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.doingbusiness.
org/about-us (last visited Sept. 13, 2017). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Simon Deakin, Viviana Mollica & Prabirjit Sarkar, Varieties of Creditor 
Protection: Insolvency Law Reform and Credit Expansion in Developed Market 
Economies (Ctr. for Bus. Research, Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 473, 
2015). 
 80. Id. at 11–12. 
 81. Id. at 8 (giving examples of evaluated variables that include the 
triggering of insolvency, appointment of bankruptcy trustees, and prioritization 
of creditor groups in liquidation proceedings). 
 82. Compare id. at 12, with WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3. 
 83. Parry & Zhang, supra note 22, at 89. 
 84. Id. at 90. 
 85. Debt Restructuring and Bankruptcy International Standards, 
EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV, http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-
do/sectors/legal-reform/debt-restructuring-and-bankruptcy/international-
standards.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2016). 
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developing countries with limited internal resources.86 While a 
variety of factors influence FDI, the development of insolvency 
laws in a stable legal system is essential for significant increases 
in FDI figures. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A variety of factors can be used to evaluate how corporations 
and individuals approach decisions for FDI. Legal issues, 
especially insolvency and bankruptcy, have often been 
overlooked as a factor. In general, investors are looking for a 
system that is predictable and efficient with a variety of legal 
rights for creditors.87 Diplomatic and geopolitical connections 
are also significant factors that can sometimes counterbalance a 
lack of the other factors being present in an FDI decision. 
In order to adjust the data for differences in overall wealth 
and relative size of each economy, the figures in this paper are 
created by dividing the FDI figure for each country by its GDP, 
which shows FDI as a percentage of GDP. The data shown in the 
figures uses locally-weighted scatterplot-smoothed analysis 
(LOWESS) to show how many countries correspond to each legal 
rights value. The LOWESS analysis also includes a trend line to 
illustrate correlation. 
A useful starting point to evaluate the impact of legal rights 
of creditors on FDI is the group of twenty largest economies in 
the world, known as the G20. The G20 consists of meetings 
between national leaders and finance ministers.88 There is no 
formal voting or authority, but it is instead a forum for 
discussion of issues.89 Among G20 countries there is a general 
pattern that higher creditor rights scores indicate higher FDI 
amounts.90 For example, countries with an average legal rights 
 
 86. Patrick Del Duca et al., U.S. Debt Markets Meet the Emerging Markets: 
Legal Challenges Faced by Cross-Border Lenders, in THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES AND DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS, supra note 32, at 
501 (concluding that businesses in emerging markets use United States 
financial markets for FDI, debt, and finance due to resources not being available 
or not having as advantageous of terms in their home countries). 
 87. See Parry & Zhang, supra note 22, at 85. 
 88. There are nineteen states on the list with the twentieth member being 
the European Union. Jamil Mustafa, What is the G20 and How Does It Work?, 
THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 3, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/0/what-
is-the-g20-and-how-does-it-work. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2; WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3. 
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score of five had just over $8 billion in average FDI for 2015 
while countries with an average score of eleven had almost $300 
billion in average FDI for 2015.91 Figure 1 illustrates the 
correlation of FDI and legal rights among G20 countries. See 
Figure 1 (figures located in appendix).92 
The United Nations Committee for Development Policy 
provides a list of “least developed countries” (LDCs).93 The list is 
created based on the factors of per capita income, human assets, 
and economic vulnerability.94 The United Nations encourages 
trade concessions for countries with this designation.95 The 
concession of development financing is especially relevant as it 
encourages grants and loans from donors and financial 
institutions.96 Accessibility of loans for businesses and projects 
is certainly a factor with a significant influence on FDI.97 
It is interesting to note that among countries designated as 
LDCs, legal rights in themselves are not a significant factor in 
determining FDI levels.98 See Figure 2.99 However, there is a 
correlation between the recovery rate of creditors and the legal 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. See List of Least Developed Countries (as of June 2017), UNITED 
NATIONS COMM. FOR DEV. POL’Y,http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/
policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_list.pdf; World Bank World Development Indicators, 
Financial access, Stability, and Efficiency (2016) http://wdi.worldbank.org/
table/5.5.; WORLD BANK, supra note 2; WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3; Jamil 
Mustafa, supra note 88. Locally-weighted scatterplot-smoothed analysis 
(LOWESS) shows how many countries correspond to each legal rights value and 
includes a trend line to illustrate correlation between the legal rights score and 
FDI as a percentage of GDP. 
 93. The list currently contains forty-eight countries. List of Least Developed 
Countries (as of June 2017), UNITED NATIONS COMM. FOR DEV. POL’Y, 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/
publication/ldc_list.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2017). 
 94. Per Capita income is defined as gross national income per capita. 
Human assets are based on indicators of nutrition, health, school enrollment, 
and literacy. Economic vulnerability is defined as indicators of natural and 
trade-related shocks, physical and economic exposure to shocks, and smallness 
and remoteness. UN recognition of Least Developed Countries (LDC), UNITED 
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., http://unctad.org/en/Pages/
ALDC/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-recognition-of-LDCs.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2017). 
 95. Id. Concessions include development financing, preferential trade, and 
technical assistance. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., supra note 85. 
 98. See WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3; THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2. 
 99. Id. 
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rights index.100 In general, higher scores on the legal rights 
index lead to higher recovery rates per dollar.101 For example, 
LDCs with a score of ten for legal rights have an average 
recovery rate per dollar of $0.35 while LDCs with a score of zero 
for legal rights have an average recovery rate per dollar of just 
$0.04.102 See Figure 3.103 While legal rights in themselves do not 
seem to directly impact FDI in LDCs, the recovery rate per dollar 
is certainly a factor that would be considered by those exploring 
FDI in LDCs.104 
There are currently 119 countries that are not part of the 
G20 or an LDC.105 When comparing legal rights and FDI there 
is a clear correlation between the two. See Figure 4.106 
A. PREDICTABILITY 
It is well-recognized that “effective and predictable rules of 
insolvency create a better environment for FDI.”107 In the United 
States, legal rights of creditors do not fluctuate significantly over 
time.108 As noted by at least one commentator “[a]bsence of 
predictability is a disincentive for FDI.”109 Lenders are more 
likely to extend credit where the outcomes of insolvency are more 
predictable and subject to “known parameters” of law.110 
 
 100. See THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS, http://www.doingbusiness.
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 102. See THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS, supra note 100; THE WORLD 
BANK, supra note 2. 
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Law, 21 IND. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 105. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2015, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/
GDP.pdf; G20, supra note 88; Least Developed Countries supra note 93. 
 106. See WORLD BANK FDI, supra note 3; THE WORLD BANK, supra note 2. 
 107. Fernando Locatelli, International Trade and Insolvency: Is the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency an Answer for Brazil?, 
REVISTA DO MINISTERIO PUBLICO DO RS, PORTO ALEGRE (2009), http://
www.amprs.com.br/public/arquivos/revista_artigo/arquivo_1259072860.pdf. 
 108. See WORLD BANK FINANCIAL ACCESS, supra note 2. 
 109. Hale E. Sheppard, The New Mexican Insolvency Law: Policy 
Justifications for U.S. Assistance, 6 UCLA J. INT’L. L. & FOREIGN AFF. 45 (2001). 
 110. Felicity Deane and Rosalind Mason, The UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency and the Rule of Law, 25 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 138 
(2016). 
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Lenders also favor jurisdictions with courts that have experience 
and specialization in bankruptcy.111 For example, the United 
States has a system of courts where judges exclusively hear 
bankruptcy cases. At least one evaluator ranks the United 
States insolvency process fairly low in its development of 
creditor rights.112 However, the United States has a system that 
is stable and predictable over time compared to the other 
countries in the study.113 
While China has a fairly developed bankruptcy procedure, 
how its court system addresses bankruptcy can be 
unpredictable, which inhibits FDI. One example that drew much 
attention involved the bankruptcy proceedings of Eastern Star 
Airlines.114 Despite the airline negotiating amicable settlements 
with all of its creditors in order to work toward restructuring, a 
Chinese court still ordered that the company be liquidated and 
dissolved.115 This example of unpredictability is a significant 
factor that has led to China being ranked fairly low in its rights 
of creditors according to the World Bank.116 Even states with 
high ratings in creditor rights may still impede investment if the 
system is unpredictable.117 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) are a common method 
to improve predictability and provide protection for investors 
engaging in FDI.118 In the United States, they are specifically 
designed to “protect private investment, to develop market-
oriented policies in partner countries, and to promote United 
States exports.”119 A BIT between the United States and 
Ecuador “recognizes that parties may protect the rights of 
creditors . . . .”120 A similar provision is found in the BIT between 
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& BUS. 559, 580–81 (2014). 
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 116. WORLD BANK FINANCIAL ACCESS, supra note 2. 
 117. Jon Ruiss, Insolvency Laws of Romania and Ukraine: Why Romania’s 
Insolvency Laws Work Better for Foreign Direct Investment, 20 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 759 (2012). 
 118. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2017). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Ecuador, art. IV, ¶ 3, Aug. 
27, 1993, http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/
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the United States and Morocco.121 A BIT between the United 
States and Jordan goes further in describing restrictions on FDI 
transfers.122 It specifically allows each contracting party to 
prevent transfers in order to apply laws of “bankruptcy, 
insolvency, or the protection of the rights of creditors.”123 
Although studies have produced mixed results, in general, the 
implementation of BITS have resulted in increased FDI levels 
for participating countries.124 
B. EFFICIENCY 
The efficiency of a country’s insolvency procedures also 
impacts FDI. In the United States, all creditors are treated 
equally, unlike some systems which use a “race to the 
courthouse” approach in distributing payments to creditors.125 
The system encourages negotiation and overall fairness toward 
respective creditors.126 In addition, United States bankruptcy 
petitions are automatically accepted at the time of filing and do 
not need formal acceptance from a court.127 This creates a fairly 
predictable process. In contrast to this approach is China’s 
bankruptcy process. While bankruptcy laws are fairly developed, 
Chinese courts have broad discretion in whether to even accept 
a bankruptcy petition.128 Chinese bankruptcy and procedural 
codes provide no guidance to courts on this important procedural 
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 121. Morocco Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Morocco, art. IV, ¶ 3(c), Jul. 
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DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 131, 146 (2005). 
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Courthouse” is a common term used in the field to describe a practice in which 
the first creditors to file their claim with the court are paid first. Each 
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all money it determines can be paid by the insolvent debtor. 
 126. P.J. Kozyris, Report for the United States of America, in CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY, supra note 5, at 244 (describing the United States bankruptcy 
process as shifting “from legalistic to economic approaches”). 
 127. Id. at 245. 
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Framework, 20 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5 art. 1, 10 (2011). 
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matter.129 Even with an updated bankruptcy code, 
unpredictability in acceptance of bankruptcy petitions by a court 
creates a serious impediment for anyone considering FDI 
opportunities in China who is using bankruptcy laws as a factor 
in the decision-making process.130 
Some countries intentionally improve efficiency by creating 
expedited procedures for simpler bankruptcy proceedings. For 
example, Switzerland has established “Summarized Bankruptcy 
Proceedings” which allow for quick liquidation without formal 
creditor meetings for simpler insolvencies.131 Switzerland’s 
creditor rights score is around the average for its region, but is 
also lower than one would expect compared to other world 
financial centers.132 It still had a fairly high FDI amount for 2015 
of nearly $98 billion.133 In 2005, France created shorter 
“conciliation” proceedings for simpler bankruptcy cases.134 That 
same year, it reached its record high FDI total of just over $85 
billion.135 Predictable, simplified and efficient bankruptcy 
procedures clearly influence FDI. More specifically, legislation 
that simplifies otherwise complex or time-consuming procedures 
generally results in higher FDI amounts. 
C. DIPLOMATIC AND GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Diplomatic and geopolitical considerations also significantly 
influence FDI decisions. There is often overlap between the top 
sources of FDI inflow and destinations of FDI outflow. For 
instance, the top five FDI inflow sources and FDI outflow 
destinations for France include the Netherlands, United States, 
Germany, and United Kingdom.136 In New Zealand, the top five 
 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Bader, supra note 4. The process also requires advance notification to 
creditors who are allowed to demand that regular bankruptcy proceedings take 
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FDI inflow sources and FDI outflow destinations overlap with 
Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom 
appearing on both lists.137 
FDI inflow to countries with lower creditor and other legal 
rights is generally from countries with close diplomatic ties. 
Bahrain currently has a creditor rights score of one.138 The 
country’s top sources of FDI inflow are Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, and the United Arab Emirates, which together account 
for over eighty percent of FDI inflows.139 All of Bahrain’s sources 
of FDI inflows, except for Libya, have at least slightly higher 
levels of creditor rights.140 Despite Bahrain’s lack of creditor 
rights, investors from countries with close diplomatic ties are 
still willing to assume the higher risks of investment in 
Bahrain.141 
D. LEGAL RIGHTS 
Investors often send FDI outflow to countries with higher 
creditor rights rankings than their own. The United States 
largest sources of FDI in 2015 were the United Kingdom, Japan, 
Canada, Germany, France, Ireland, Switzerland, and 
Netherlands.142 Together, these accounted for just over seventy-
five percent of FDI inflows for the United States.143 All of these 
countries had lower creditor rights rankings than the United 
States with Japan, Germany, France, Ireland, Switzerland, and 
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China provides an interesting illustration of the concept 
working the other way as well, in that those investing in 
developing countries with lower levels of creditor rights tend to 
be from the most developed countries.145 China’s top sources of 
FDI inflows are Hong Kong, British Virgin Islands, Japan, 
Singapore, and the United States.146 While a separate legal 
rights score is not available for Hong Kong or the British Virgin 
Islands, Singapore and the United States have significantly 
higher levels of creditor rights than China.147 This data suggests 
that investors from less-developed countries are generally not 
willing to assume the risks of investing within the still-
developing Chinese financial system.148 
E. EXAMPLES OF INSOLVENCY LAW DIRECTLY IMPACTING FDI 
This section provides a few examples of insolvency and 
bankruptcy laws having a direct impact on FDI. Changes that 
improve creditor rights or predictability generally result in 
increases to FDI figures the same year the change is 
implemented or shortly after once the new policy is better 
publicized or understood.149 In contrast, changes that are seen 
as reducing creditor rights, even minimally, can cause long-
lasting harm in the form of reduced FDI amounts.150 
The World Bank Doing Business project provides several 
suggestions and guidelines for broad policy changes to 
bankruptcy laws.151 It suggests that improving reorganization 
procedures reduces failure rates among firms.152 Bankruptcy 
procedures can also impact loan terms, leverage ratios, and bank 
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recovery rates.153 During 2015 and 2016, the World Bank reports 
that at least twenty-four countries had enacted significant 
bankruptcy reforms including some conducted at the regional 
level.154 
1. France 
While FDI figures vary significantly from one year to 
another, there is an overall increase in France’s FDI from 1970–
2015.155 Interestingly, legal rights of creditors also varied during 
this time.156 During times of lower rights for creditors, FDI also 
decreases.157 For example, from 2000–2005, the average debtor 
control score dropped to its lowest point since at least 1970.158 
France’s highest FDI ever received occurred in 2005 and has had 
an overall pattern of decline since that time.159 The data 
suggests that as the score dropped, so did investor confidence in 
the predictability of the system and that the damage is 
ongoing.160 From 1984–1990, there was an increase in overall 
creditor rights.161 In 1984, the FDI for France was just over $2 
billion while in 1990 it was just over $13 billion.162 These figures 
indicate that improvements to legal rights of creditors leads to 
increased FDI whereas lowering levels of creditor rights, even 
due to seemingly minor changes, can have lasting impacts on 
FDI decisions.163 
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2. United States 
In 2005, the United State Bankruptcy Code was updated to 
incorporate the UNCITRAL Model Law.164 This update made 
United States recognition of cross-border insolvency proceedings 
more predictable.165 In 2007, the United States reached its 
highest FDI inflow amount since 2000 which was not surpassed 
until 2015.166 The improved predictability of an already well-
developed bankruptcy code seems to have had an impact on FDI 
levels as the new provisions were implemented. 
3. New Zealand 
After a seven year review, New Zealand passed the 
Companies Amendment Act of 2006.167 Prior to the Act, 
bankruptcy proceedings generally required unanimous 
agreement of settlements with creditors or complete 
liquidation.168 The Act provided alternative procedures allowing 
for reorganization of an insolvent entity.169 The law came into 
force in 2007.170 New Zealand also experienced its highest FDI 
levels on record in 2007.171 Investors seem to have been 
influenced by the changes to New Zealand’s improved 
bankruptcy process which resulted in the record FDI levels. 
4. Russia 
In October of 2002, Russia passed legislation rewriting their 
insolvency laws to bring them in line with modern international 
standards.172 Further updates were made over several years and 
the law was formally implemented in 2009.173 Even though the 
provisions were not formally implemented until later, the 
preliminary legislation reforming insolvency laws led to 
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increased FDI.174 In 2003, FDI levels rose significantly,175 and in 
2004, they nearly doubled from their 2003 levels.176 Even 
preliminary work toward insolvency law reform can impact FDI 
levels as corporations see improvement to existing legal 
procedures.177 
5. European Union 
The European Union provides a broader overview of the 
same concept. While each member has its own bankruptcy laws, 
the European Union also has regulations for cross-border 
insolvency in European Council Regulation 1346/2000.178 Some 
of the provisions include guidelines for determining jurisdiction 
and full recognition of foreign proceedings.179 These guidelines 
improve predictability of cross-border insolvency proceedings at 
the regional level.180 Europe also has the second-highest legal 
rights score of any region with only North America receiving a 
higher score.181 The result of the combined rights of creditors and 
increased predictability in cross-border insolvency is that the 
European Union accounts for twenty-nine percent of global FDI 
and receives just over $20 billion more in FDI than North 
America.182 
6. China 
China provides an interesting exception to the pattern of 
bankruptcy laws leading to increases in FDI. In 2007, China 
implemented numerous reforms to update its bankruptcy 
process.183 Oddly, the number of bankruptcies declined as the 
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new policies were implemented.184 Despite China’s population, 
it has significantly fewer bankruptcy filings than comparable 
countries.185 In 2009, the United States had 1,473,675 
bankruptcy filings while China only had 2,434.186 While there is 
a slight increase in FDI after 2007, by 2016, FDI had returned 
to being very similar to the levels received in 2008 and only 
slightly higher than the 2007 figures.187 
There are additional issues with China in its requirements 
and procedures for managers of companies experiencing 
insolvency. Individual managers are generally forbidden from 
leaving the country and are subject to civil penalties for 
insolvency.188 In addition, government-appointed liquidation 
panels, which can speak on behalf of management, often consist 
of bureaucrats rather than financial and legal professionals.189 
For example, during the reorganization of one company, a 24 
member panel consisted of one accountant, one lawyer, and a 
myriad of government officials including several mayors and an 
administrator for a government environmental agency.190 While 
the official laws allow for broad creditor protections, the 
approach to management and use of a bureaucratic process 
rather than a judicial one hinders the implementation of the 
rights that are alleged to exist. 
While reforms were enacted, the reality was that they were 
merely a façade on the same system. The reforms also only 
addressed insolvency of corporations and not of individuals.191 
Corruption is still prevalent in Chinese courts which obviously 
leads to unpredictable and contradictory bankruptcy 
outcomes.192 In addition, the process of registering a business in 
China is often quite difficult.193 While China’s FDI rates are 
fairly stable, they are small, relative to the country’s 
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population.194 The combination of unpredictability in 
bankruptcy outcomes and inefficiency within the courts has 
prevented China from experiencing the full benefits of increased 
FDI as a result of improved bankruptcy procedures.195 
III. CONCLUSION 
The adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law has 
significantly influenced cross-border insolvency. There are 
several examples of cases in which United States courts deferred 
to decisions of foreign courts in addressing specific cross-border 
insolvencies. Studies and recommendations from the World 
Bank have influenced recent legislative changes in how 
countries address cross-border insolvency. 
Insolvency laws have usually been overlooked as a variable 
in how FDI decisions are reached. A comparison of legal rights 
of creditors with FDI statistics shows a direct correlation 
between improvements to insolvency and bankruptcy laws and 
higher FDI amounts. Investors are looking for stability and 
predictability in the event of the failure of a business venture. 
States with higher ratings for legal rights generally also have 
higher rates of FDI. While a variety of factors influence FDI, it 
is clear that the development of insolvency and bankruptcy laws 
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